A number of incentive-compliance classification systems have been developed to explain differences in the power and hold of organizations in relation to their members. Terms such as "coercive," "normative," "purposive," "solidary," and "material incentive" are used to describe the incentive-compliance base. 
organizational compliance systems. Clark and Wilson ( 1961 ) , following Barnard (1938) , employ yet another set of concepts when they discuss &dquo;material,&dquo; &dquo;purposive,&dquo; and &dquo;solidary incentives.&dquo; Warriner (1965) (1962, 1973) ; Zald and Ash's discussion of social movement organizations (1966); Warriner's (1965) and Warriner and Prather's (1965) research on voluntary associations; Oberschall's (1973) discussion of the social control of social movements; Hofstetter's ( 1973) and Conway and Feigert's (1968) work on political party participation; Bailis ( 1974) on the welfare rights movement in Massachusetts. Etzioni's (1975) Nevertheless, the fact that these classifications only partially overlap and that they sometimes use similar words for organizations that employ quite different incentives is confusing and uneconomical. It also suggests that the authors are leaving out salient dimensions or making implicit simplifying assumptions.
The purpose of this paper is to present a property space (Lazarsfeld, 1937) Baldwin (1971: 23-24) There are three major types of positive incentives with low transferability: ( 1 ) those in which the intrinsic satisfaction comes from associating with the particular people in the organization (solidary incentives); (2) those in which the intrinsic satisfaction comes from the tasks the groups perform (avocational groups); and (3) those in which the members receive satisfaction from the goals the organization strives to attain (purposive incentives). Differences among organizations are reflected in the social structure of the groups, the degree of status homogeneity, and the durability and flexibility of each organization (see Warriner, 1965, and Warriner and Prather, 1965 Emerson, 1962, or Thibaut and Kelley, 1959 [420] portionate decrease in the number of buyers (Mansfield, 1970 (Zald, 1970 Etzioni (1975) and Wilson (1973) Bailey (1972 Bailey ( , 1973 Etzioni (1975: 27) notes that the forms of coercion in which he is interested are dependent upon such boundary control.
6. This is the organizational delivery side of the concept of expected utility, which decision theorists use in incorporating probability of payoff into individual choice functions, See Siegel et al. (1964) .
7. Paid staff in these associations receive high-probability incentives, while other members, lower probability incentives.
8. We should note that transferability relates to other dimensions of incentives that a finer-grained analysis might include. Pursuing the analogy to money, we would separate from transferability (1) the alienability of incentives (the extent to which they adhere to the recipient or are detachable); (2) their generalizability (the extent to which the amount of utility is abstracted from the incentive); and (3) the divisibility of incentives (the extent to which utility is infinitely divisible or must be delivered in "lumpy" units). These dimensions overly complicate the present property space and are therefore excluded.
9. Wilson's purposive organization and most of Etzioni's "pure normative organizations" are of these kinds (see Wilson, 1973: 35, 46; Etzioni, 1975: 10-11, 40-41) . Utility is gained through either identification with direct beneficiaries or through the sense of moral or altruistic self worth that comes through the assuagement of internalized values (see Kelman, 1958 (1970) .
